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Aridity, and aridity alone, makes the various Wests one. The distinctive western
plants and animals, the hard clarity (before power plants and metropolitan traffic
altered it) of the western air, the look and location of western towns, the empty
spaces that separate them, the way farms and ranches are either densely concentrated
where water is plentiful or widely scattered where it is scarce, . . . [the] noticeable
federal presence as dam builder and water broker, . . . those are all consequences, and
by no means all the consequences, of aridity.1
Given the dry climate of the western United States, it is only through crea-
tive engineering that states like Nevada accommodate settlement and develop-
ment. In pursuit of development, man has “acted upon the western landscape
with the force of a geological agent.”2 This engineering has indeed fostered
significant growth in the desert, but “aridity still calls the tune, directs our tink-
ering, prevents the healing of our mistakes; and vast unwatered reaches still
emphasize the contrast between the desert and the sown.”3 With aridity at the
helm, the future of water law in Nevada remains unpredictable. This Note dis-
cusses the impact that Nevada’s explicit adoption of the public trust doctrine
may have on the administration of water in the desert climate that dominates
the state.
The public trust doctrine is based on the premise that certain resources
belong to the public and a state holds those resources in trust for its people. In
2011, Nevada adopted the doctrine and although the entire impact is uncertain,
one thing is clear: it opens the door for judicial challenges. Specifically, the
most logical extension of the doctrine in Nevada is to water law. If, in fact, this
extension occurs, the allocation of water resources by government officials may
be significantly impacted. California, a state to which Nevada often looks for
persuasive legal precedent,4 has already liberally extended the doctrine to water
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1 WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRINGS 61 (1992).
2 Id. at 47.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Elham Roohani, Note, Covenants Not to Compete in Nevada: A Proposal, 10
NEV. L.J. 260, 282 (2009) (arguing that Nevada traditionally looks to California when it is
adopting new laws); Clark v. Lubritz, 944 P.2d 861, 865 n.6 (Nev. 1997) (quoting Craigo v.
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allocation cases. If Nevada follows suit, two states—each with rapidly increas-
ing populations and one with a notoriously dry climate—will be set to collide
in a battle over the public interest in water rights along their shared borders.
Part I of this Note discusses the origins of the public trust doctrine, fol-
lowed by a brief review of its adoption in the United States. Parts II and III
explain the progression of the doctrine in California and Nevada, respectively.
California is included in the analysis because of its proximity to Nevada, its
liberal expansion of the doctrine, and possible conflicts that may arise between
the neighboring states. Part IV describes the Nevada Supreme Court decision
that prompted this note: Lawrence v. Clark County. Part V discusses current
water law in the neighboring states. Part VI provides argument for and against
applying the public trust doctrine to Nevada water law. Finally, Part VII dis-
cusses possible conflicts between Nevada and California.
I. HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is a principle of law that dates back as far as
Roman law and the work of Emperor Justinian.5 According to Justinian, “the
public possesses inviolable rights to certain natural resources,”6 and “[b]y the
law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the
sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”7 Under this notion of resource
law, the government preserves certain property, such as that used for navigation
and fishing, for the benefit of the public.8 Thus, unlike “general public prop-
erty,” the state could not transfer these property interests to those who might
impair the public’s access to such resources.9
Taking its cue from Roman law, England’s public trust doctrine prohibited
the monarchy from granting away lands that were subject to the public trust.10
The common law of England maintained that “ ‘title in the soil of the sea, or of
arms of the sea, below ordinary high-water mark, is in the King’ and that such
title ‘is held subject to the public right.’ ”11 Parliament, on the other hand, had
the ability to transfer public trust lands, subject to the public trust doctrine.12
To abide, Parliament would confer an easement on the conveyed land for pub-
lic fishing and navigation, creating more of a “use-dependent conception” of
the public trust doctrine.13
Circus-Circus Enters., 786 P.2d 22, 23 (Nev. 1990)) (recognizing that “Nevada’s statute on
punitive damages is a verbatim copy of the California punitive damages statute”).
5 Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 608 (Nev. 2011).
6 Id.
7 Id. (quoting J. INST. 2.1.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 1970)).
8 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 476.
11 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 609 (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894)).
12 Danielle Spiegel, Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save Western Groundwater?, 18 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 412, 425 (2010).
13 Id.
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In 1821, the United States began adopting public trust principles through
the common law.14 However, the law in the United States emerged as a hybrid
of Roman and English law.15 For example, similar to Roman law, in the United
States “the seashore between high and low tide may not be routinely granted to
private owners.”16 Rather, upon admission to the Union, the states hold that
portion of the seashore in “trusteeship for the public.”17 However, similar to
English law, U.S. law allows the states to maintain some power in regulating
the use and distribution of public trust resources such as the seashore.18
The extent of the states’ power to transfer resources, subject to the public
trust doctrine, remains a topic of debate.19 If the states’ trusteeship puts public
resources out of state government reach, then the use of those resources would
be unchangeable and the land inalienable.20 Conversely, if states are con-
strained only to actions consistent with their police power, the states can dictate
the use of public resources as long as the conduct of the state government is
“exercised for a public purpose” and not a gift of “public property for a strictly
private purpose.”21
A brief review of the public trust doctrine’s development helps set the
framework for a review of the roles of not only state governments but also the
judiciary in the application of the doctrine to water rights.
In 1892, the Supreme Court decided Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illi-
nois, the seminal case in American public trust law.22 Illinois Central involved
an act of the state legislature that granted a railroad company nearly the entirety
of submerged lands in the Chicago Harbor of Lake Michigan.23 After four
years, the state tried to rescind the transfer, claiming that the land was subject
to the public trust and thus, the state did not have the authority to transfer the
land.24
Moving beyond England’s doctrine, the Court declared that the public
trust doctrine was not limited to land affected by tidal waters.25 Rather, the
geography of the United States, where rivers used for commerce stretch for
thousands of miles before the tide affects them,26 necessitated an extension of
14 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 609 (citing Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (N.J. 1821)).
15 Sax, supra note 8, at 476–77.
16 Id. at 476.
17 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988).
19 Sax, supra note 8, at 476–77.
20 Id. at 477.
21 Id.
22 See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
23 Id. at 451.
24 Id. at 438.
25 Id. at 437.
26 Id. at 436. Compare J.C. KAMMERER, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, WATER FACT SHEET:
LARGEST RIVERS IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY REP. NO. 87-242
(1990), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1987/ofr87-242/pdf/ofr87242.pdf (detailing the
length of the longest rivers in the United States: Missouri River 2,540 miles and Mississippi
River 2,340 miles from source to mouth), with Seven Man Made Wonders: The River Sev-
ern, BBC HOME, http://www.bbc.co.uk/england/sevenwonders/west/severn-river/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2012) (detailing the length of the River Severn, Britain’s longest river, at 220
miles from source to mouth).
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the doctrine to navigable waters.27 As a body of water heavily used for naviga-
tion and commerce,28 Lake Michigan fell squarely within the Court’s definition
of non-tidal, navigable waters. Accordingly, the lake’s waters and the land
underneath the lake were granted to Illinois upon its admission to the Union.29
However, that land was “different in character from that which the state holds
in lands intended for sale,” the Court held.30 Specifically, the Court determined
that Illinois possessed only “title held in trust for the people of the state, that
they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and
have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of
private parties.”31 Thus, Illinois held the lake and underlying land in trust for
the people and, because the land was subject to the public trust, Illinois’ trans-
fer was void and the railroad was not entitled to compensation for the value of
the property.32
Although the Illinois Central Court recognized that public rights are para-
mount, it refused to label those rights absolute. Rather, the Court held the state
could transfer trust resources if (1) transferring the property would improve
public access to the resource, or (2) the conveyance would not substantially
impair “the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.”33 Thus, a state
holding land in the public trust can privatize public resources, but it must con-
sider the significant interest of the public in any dispensation or use of that
resource. Further, the Court made clear that governmental conduct that reallo-
cates trust resources in a way that restricts public uses or makes the use of those
resources vulnerable to self-interested private parties will be subject to skepti-
cism through judicial review.34
Despite establishing the public trust doctrine in the United States and
extending it to navigable waters, the Illinois Central Court did not address the
scope of the waters to be included. Lake Michigan provided an obvious exam-
ple of a navigable body of water, but the navigability of smaller bodies of water
remained unsettled. In 1922, the Court revisited the issue in Brewer-Elliott Oil
& Gas Co. v. United States, setting forth a federal standard for determining
navigability.35 The test defines navigable water as that which is
27 The U.S. Supreme Court uses a “navigability in fact” standard to define navigability in
the context of the public trust doctrine. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 436;
Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 89 (1922). According to Illinois
Central, navigable waters included “public, navigable water[s], on which commerce is car-
ried on between different states or nations,” regardless of whether those waters were subject
to the tide. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 436. The Supreme Court clarified the “navigabil-
ity in fact” standard in Brewer-Elliott Oil, defining navigability as a body of water that is
“used, or is susceptible of being used in its ordinary condition, as a highway for commerce
over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade, and
travel on water.” The mode by which commerce is conducted thereon, or the difficulties
attending navigation is not conclusive. Brewer-Elliott Oil, 260 U.S. at 86.
28 Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 454.
29 Id. at 434–35.
30 Id. at 452.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 455.
33 Id. at 452–453.
34 Sax, supra note 8, at 490.
35 Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922).
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susceptible of being used in its ordinary condition, as a highway for commerce over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade, and
travel on water. It does not depend upon the mode by which commerce is conducted
upon it, whether by steamers, sailing vessels or flat boats, nor upon the difficulties
attending navigation, but upon the fact whether the river in its natural state is such
that it affords a channel for useful commerce.36
With federal adoption of the doctrine and federal standards for qualifying
resources, application of the public trust doctrine seemed to emerge as an issue
for the federal courts. However, early in public trust jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court clarified that the states determine the limits of the doctrine.37 In
Shively v. Bowlby, the Court declared that each state has the authority to deter-
mine the use of public resources “according to its own views of justice and
policy . . . as it consider[s] for the best interests of the public.”38 The Shively
Court applied the equal footing doctrine39 and stipulated that states “admitted
into the Union since the adoption of the constitution” were entitled to sover-
eignty over the “tide waters, and in the lands below the high-water mark, within
their respective jurisdictions.”40 More recently, the Court reiterated this state-
specific application in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi.41 Thus, state gov-
ernments retain the discretion to apply the public trust doctrine. The Court,
however, did not resolve whether this discretionary application has any
limitations.
In 1970, Professor Joseph Sax argued for a movement to expand the pub-
lic trust doctrine beyond navigable waterways and the land underneath them.42
Professor Sax argued, “[p]ublic trust problems are found whenever governmen-
tal regulation comes into question, and they occur in a wide range of situations
in which diffuse public interests need protection against tightly organized
groups with clear and immediate goals.”43 According to Professor Sax, the fre-
quency of these “public trust problems” dictated an expansion of the doctrine to
include environmental issues such as air pollution and wetland filling.44
To protect public interests when expanding this doctrine, Professor Sax
suggested that the judiciary should act as a democratic tool for a “diffuse
majority.”45 In his estimation, a “concerted minority” will often have substan-
36 Id.
37 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
38 Id.
39 The equal footing doctrine relates back to the English common law and the principle that
the Crown held sovereign title to lands underlying navigable waterways. Utah Div. of State
Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 196 (1987). Accordingly, “[w]hen the 13 Colonies
became independent from Great Britain, they claimed title to the lands under navigable
waters within their boundaries as the sovereign successors to the English Crown.” Id. (citing
Shively, 152 U.S. at 15). Since all States admitted to the Union after the original thirteen
enter on an “equal footing,” they hold title to land under navigable waters within their bor-
ders upon receiving statehood. Id. (citing Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L. Ed.
565 (1845)).
40 Shively, 152 U.S. at 26.
41 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988).
42 Sax, supra note 8, at 477.
43 Id. at 556.
44 Id. at 556–57.
45 Id. at 560.
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tial influence on the administration of trust resources.46 Thus, the judiciary pro-
cess must “remand[ ] appropriate cases to the legislature after public opinion
has been aroused.”47 With judiciary safeguards in place, the court simply seeks
an even playing field for interested parties and leaves the final determination to
a more democratic process.48
Although a significant number of states have embraced Professor Sax’s
theory of expanding the doctrine,49 the extent of this expansion remains a state-
specific concern. Thus, to analyze the doctrine’s application to water law in
Nevada and California and the impact this application may have on water
issues between the neighboring states, it is necessary to review each state’s
adoption and development of the doctrine.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN CALIFORNIA
Prior to the adoption of its constitution in 1879, California regularly
granted fee simple absolute ownership to extensive tracts of land completely
submerged under the ocean.50 Recognizing the danger of conveying lands that
held considerable public value for navigation and fishing, California courts
began limiting fee simple grants.51 For instance, in Kimball v. MacPherson, the
California Supreme Court held that “[n]othing short of a very explicit provi-
sion . . . would justify us in holding that the Legislature intended to permit the
shore of the ocean, between high[-] and low-water mark, to be converted into
private ownership.”52 Kimball, along with other California cases, developed the
proposition that the state government may not convey the public trust to private
parties.53
However, subsequent California cases loosened this absolute rule against
land conveyance. For instance, the landmark case of People v. California Fish
Co. adopted the proposition that the grantee of trust resources will take “at
most, only the title to the soil subject to the public right of navigation.”54 Thus,
courts no longer invalidated grants of trust resources. Instead, courts began
upholding the grants, labeling them subject to the public’s right to access those
resources.55 Therefore, the public received rights akin to an easement in the
resource.56
Consistent with Professor Sax’s theory, California has broadly expanded
the scope of the public trust doctrine.57 For instance, in Marks v. Whitney, the
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Spiegel, supra note 12, at 430.
50 Sax, supra note 8, at 525.
51 Id. at 525–26.
52 Kimball v. Macpherson, 46 Cal. 103, 108 (1873).
53 Sax, supra note 8, at 528.
54 People v. California Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 84 (Cal. 1913); Sax, supra note 8, at 528.
55 Sax, supra note 8, at 528.
56 Id.; California Fish Co., 138 P. at 87–88.
57 See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 721–22 (Cal. 1983)
(expanding the doctrine to include protection for aesthetic and recreational values associated
with water).
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California Supreme Court recognized that California has expanded public trust
easements beyond the traditional areas of “navigation, commerce and fisher-
ies.”58 The expansion included “the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for
boating and general recreation purposes the navigable waters of the state, and
to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other
purposes.”59 Additionally, the Marks court recognized that the public trust doc-
trine is well suited to protecting tidelands in their natural state.60 This includes
preservation of these resources for their value as “ecological units for scientific
study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for
birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the
area.”61
Perhaps the most significant expansion of the public trust doctrine in Cali-
fornia came in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court. The predominant
form of water administration in California is prior appropriation, a “first in
time, first in right” standard.62 Essentially, “the first person who acts toward
the diversion of water from a natural stream and the application of such water
to a beneficial use has the first right, provided he diligently continues his enter-
prise to completion and beneficially applies the water.”63 National Audubon
recognized that California’s system of prior appropriation was on a “collision
course” with the public trust doctrine.64 The case involved a public trust chal-
lenge brought by environmental groups concerned with the impact of water
diversion65 on Mono Lake, California.66 The California Supreme Court held
that the state has an affirmative duty to consider the public interest in planning
and allocating water resources.67 This duty includes consideration of the diver-
sion of non-navigable tributaries to navigable bodies of water when such diver-
sions significantly affect the recreational or ecological value of a body of
water.68 Seeking to accommodate the public trust and appropriative rights, the
National Audubon court found that the concept of the public trust prevents any
party from acquiring and using water rights in “a manner [that is] harmful to
58 Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 724.
63 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 98 (1938). See also
discussion infra Part V.
64 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 712.
65 In prior appropriation, diverting water for use away from the source “traditionally served
dual purposes providing notice of a user’s intent to appropriate water, and defining the extent
of the use.” In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to the Use of All the Water, 55 P.3d
396, 402 (Mont. 2002). Today, diversion has lost some of its significance because beneficial
use is now the “touchstone of the appropriation doctrine.” Id. at 399. Further, most appropri-
ation states now operate under a permitting system that satisfies the “notice of intent”
requirement. Water Law: An Overview, NAT’L AGRIC. LAW CENTER, http://www.nationalag
lawcenter.org/assets/overviews/waterlaw.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). See also discus-
sion infra Part V.
66 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 711–12.
67 Id. at 728.
68 Id. at 719, 721.
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the interests protected by the public trust.”69 Thus, the government has an
affirmative duty to ensure proper water allocation that is consistent with the
public trust doctrine.
Finally, the National Audubon court determined that the public trust doc-
trine requires supervision over the allocation of not just future water rights but
also existing water rights.70 The significance of this concept is that established
water rights may be subject to challenge. As the National Audubon court saw
it, “[i]n exercising its sovereign power to allocate water resources in the public
interest, the state is not confined by past allocation decisions which may be
incorrect in light of current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.”71
Additionally, “any member of the general public has standing to raise a claim
of harm to the public trust.”72 Thus, all water allocation decisions, both past
and present, are subject to judicial review in challenges brought by members of
the public.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NEVADA
Although Lawrence v. Clark County marked the first explicit adoption of
the public trust doctrine in Nevada, prior case law recognized several of the
doctrine’s fundamental principles.73 For instance, Nevada jurisprudence began
recognizing public trust principles in State Engineer v. Cowles Bros., Inc.74
Cowles owned lands adjacent to the dry Winnemucca Lake and sought a permit
to drill a well on the lakebed.75 The Cowles court determined that:
When a territory is endowed with statehood[,] one of the many items its sovereignty
includes is the grant from the federal government of all navigable bodies of water
within the particular territory, whether they be rivers, lakes or streams. If the body of
water is classified as non-navigable at the time of the creation of the state, the under-
lying land remains the property of the United States, but if it is navigable under the
definition hereinafter stated, the water and the bed beneath it becomes the property of
the state.76
Thus, Cowles recognized the right of the states in lands or waterways that
were “navigable” at the time of statehood.
Two years after Cowles, the Supreme Court of Nevada implicitly
acknowledged the public trust doctrine in State v. Bunkowski.77 The court
stated, “[i]t has been held, in what appears to be a majority of cases, that the
states hold title to the beds of navigable watercourses in trust for the people of
their respective states,”78 ultimately concluding that “[t]he State holds the sub-
ject lands in trust for public use.”79 However, the Bunkowski court found that
69 Id. at 727.
70 Id. at 728.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 716 n.11 (citing Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971)).
73 Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 609 (Nev. 2011).
74 State Eng’r v. Cowles Bros., Inc., 478 P.2d 159, 160 (Nev. 1970).
75 Id.
76 Id. (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931)).
77 State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Nev. 1972).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1238.
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legislation could “alienate public trust lands without breaking the public
trust.”80 The only clarification of that finding was that the legislature must
make an “express” and “proper” determination.81
Recently, in Mineral County v. State Department of Conservation,
Supreme Court of Nevada Justice Rose advocated, in a concurring opinion, for
adoption and clarification of the public trust doctrine.82 The case was an origi-
nal writ proceeding in which the petitioner, Mineral County, sought writs of
mandamus and prohibition to prevent “future actions that threaten to decrease
future water flows into Walker Lake.”83 The court denied the petitions in Min-
eral County on procedural grounds, but Justice Rose asserted that:
This court has itself recognized that this public ownership of water is the “most
fundamental tenet of Nevada water law.” Additionally, we have noted that those
holding vested water rights do not own or acquire title to water, but merely enjoy a
right to the beneficial use of the water. This right, however, is forever subject to the
public trust, which at all times “forms the outer boundaries of permissible govern-
ment action with respect to public trust resources.” In this manner, then, the public
trust doctrine operates simultaneously with the system of prior appropriation.84
In Justice Rose’s opinion, it is the affirmative duty of the state to protect
“the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands.”85
Further, Justice Rose argued that states could surrender this “right of protection
only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the
purposes of the trust.”86 However, Mineral County fell short of the explicit
adoption of the public trust doctrine Justice Rose sought.
Along with scattered support in case law, public trust principles appear in
Nevada statutory and constitutional provisions.87 First, the gift clause found in
Article 8, Section 9 of the Nevada Constitution limits the state’s ability to dis-
pose of public resources: “The State shall not donate or loan money, or its
credit, subscribe to or be, interested in the Stock of any company, association,
or corporation, except corporations formed for educational or charitable pur-
poses.”88 In consideration of the gift clause, the Supreme Court of Nevada
stated, “transactions disbursing public funds must be struck down if not made
for a public purpose.”89 Thus, under the gift clause, the state serves as trustee
for public resources under the public trust doctrine.90
80 Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 610 (Nev. 2011) (citing Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at
1237–38).
81 Id. (citing Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1237–38).
82 Mineral Cnty. v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 807 (Nev. 2001) (en banc) (Rose, J., concurring).
83 Id. at 801.
84 Id. at 808 (Rose, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
85 Id. at 809 (quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal.
1983)).
86 Id. (quoting Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 724).
87 See NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 9; NEV. REV. STAT. § 321.0005 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 533.025 (2011).
88 NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 9.
89 Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 612 (Nev. 2011) (citing State ex rel. Brennan v.
Bowman, 512 P.2d 1321 (Nev. 1973)).
90 Id.
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Second, Nevada Revised Statute (“NRS”) 321.0005 and NRS 533.025
provide further statutory support for the public trust doctrine. NRS 321.0005
provides in part:
The Legislature declares the policy of this State regarding the use of state lands to be
that state lands must be used in the best interest of the residents of this State, and to
that end the lands may be used for recreational activities, the production of revenue
and other public purposes.91
NRS 533.025 provides that “[t]he water of all sources of water supply
within the boundaries of the State whether above or beneath the surface of the
ground, belongs to the public.”92 Essentially, these statutes “recognize that the
public land and water of this state do not belong to the state to use for any
purpose, but only for those purposes that comport with the public’s interest in
the particular property, exemplifying the fiduciary principles at the heart of the
public trust doctrine.”93 With scattered support in the judiciary and clear statu-
tory support, explicit adoption of the doctrine under Lawrence was nearly a
foregone conclusion.
IV. LAWRENCE V. CLARK COUNTY
Lawrence v. Clark County, a case that began as a debate over the dispen-
sation of land once under the Colorado River, should have major implications
for the future of Nevada water law. By enacting the Fort Mohave Valley Devel-
opment Law (“FMVDL”), Nevada allowed the Colorado River Commission
(“CRC”) “to acquire federal land in the Fort Mohave Valley near Laughlin,
within Clark County limits.”94 Subsequently, under a recent amendment to the
FMVDL, CRC was required to transfer its Fort Mohave Land to Clark
County.95 James R. Lawrence, in his capacity as the Nevada State Land Regis-
trar, transferred all of the Fort Mohave Land, with the exception of 330 acres.96
Mr. Lawrence contended that those 330 acres were submerged under the Colo-
rado River at the time that Nevada received statehood and were thus subject to
the public trust doctrine.97
After Mr. Lawrence refused to transfer the 330 acres, Clark County filed a
complaint for declaratory relief, seeking an order to require the transfer of the
land.98 Mr. Lawrence filed a counterclaim “seeking a declaration that the dis-
puted land was subject to the public trust doctrine and therefore was not trans-
ferable.”99 The district court granted a motion for a judgment on the pleadings
in favor of Clark County and ordered Mr. Lawrence to deed the land to the
county.100 In the opinion of the district court, the land was not within the cur-
rent channel of the Colorado River and thus was not subject to the public trust
91 NEV. REV. STAT. § 321.0005.
92 NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025.
93 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 613 (emphasis added).
94 Id. at 608.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
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doctrine.101 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether
“state-owned land that was once submerged under a waterway can be freely
transferred to respondent Clark County, or whether the public trust doctrine
prohibits such a transfer.”102
After a review of the doctrine, the Supreme Court of Nevada expressly
adopted the public trust doctrine.103 The explicit adoption, in turn, crystallized
the case-specific question: Was the land subject to the public trust doctrine?
The Lawrence court ultimately left this determination to the district court but
laid out a clear test to make the decision. The first crucial determination is
“whether the land was submerged beneath navigable water when Nevada joined
the United States on October 31, 1864.”104 Navigability turns on whether “[a]
body of water . . . is used or is usable in its ordinary condition as a highway of
commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the custom-
ary modes of trade and travel on water.”105 Second, “[i]f land was beneath
navigable waters when Nevada joined the United States, but is now exposed,
whether that land remains subject to the public trust doctrine generally depends
on the manner in which it became dry—whether by reliction or avulsion.”106
Reliction is “the gradual and imperceptible exposure of the land.”107 Avul-
sion, on the other hand, refers to “sudden changes in the course of a stream.”108
When the land becomes dry through reliction, “title to the dry water bed is
passed to the adjoining shoreland owners,” even if artificial means prompted
the change.109 Conversely, when the land becomes dry through avulsion, “title
is not taken away or bestowed.”110 Reliction can occur through artificial means,
but so can avulsion.111 In Lawrence, the reliction/avulsion distinction was criti-
cal because if the land became dry through reliction, “the public trust doctrine
does not apply to that land. But if the portion of the Colorado River covering
the land was navigable at the time of Nevada’s statehood, and the land thereaf-
ter became dry through avulsion, the public trust doctrine applies.”112
The final guidelines set by the Lawrence court involved the transferability
of land subject to the public trust doctrine. The court held that:
[W]hen assessing [public trust] dispensations, courts of this state must consider (1)
whether the dispensation was made for a public purpose, (2) whether the state
received fair consideration in exchange for the dispensation, and (3) whether the
dispensation satisfies “the state’s special obligation to maintain the trust for the use
and enjoyment of present and future generations.”113
101 Id.
102 Id. at 607.
103 Id. at 617.
104 Id. at 614.
105 Id. (quoting State Eng’r v. Cowles Bros., Inc., 478 P.2d 159, 160 (Nev. 1970)).
106 Id.
107 Id. (citing Cowles, 478 P.2d at 161).
108 Id. at 614–615 (quoting Peterson v. Morton, 465 F. Supp. 986, 997 (D. Nev. 1979)).
109 Id. at 614 (citing Cowles, 478 P.2d at 161).
110 Id. at 614–15 (citing Peterson, 465 F. Supp. at 997).
111 Id. at 615.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 616 (citing Arizona Ctr. for Law v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 170 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991)).
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The court labeled the first of these two considerations as “common to any
dispensation of public trust property,” and the third as particularly applicable to
“navigable waterways under the public trust.”114 Additionally, aware of the fact
that public trust resources may change over time, the court laid out factors to
consider in determining whether a dispensation comports with the state’s duty
as trustee.115 These factors are:
[T]he degree of effect of the project on public trust uses, navigation, fishing, recrea-
tion and commerce; the impact of the individual project on the public trust resource;
the impact of the individual project when examined cumulatively with existing
impediments to full use of the public trust resource . . . ; the impact of the project on
the public trust resource when that resource is examined in light of the primary pur-
pose for which the resource is suited, i.e. commerce, navigation, fishing or recrea-
tion; and the degree to which broad public uses are set aside in favor of more limited
or private ones.116
Although it laid out specific tests for appropriate public trust considera-
tions, the court made it clear that legislative intent is entitled to deference.117
However, courts will closely examine any legislative action when the public
trust doctrine applies.118
The Lawrence court remanded the case to determine whether the land was
submerged at the time of Nevada’s statehood and the manner in which the land
became dry.119 To understand the implications of this decision and the impact it
may have on interstate conflicts in water law, the next section provides a brief
review of current water law in Nevada and California, followed by a careful
analysis of the likely impact of this decision on water law in Nevada.
V. CURRENT WATER LAW IN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA
In the United States, water is allocated through two methods: riparian
rights and prior appropriation.120 Under the riparian system, those who own
land adjacent to a water source have rights to use that water on their adjacent
land.121 This is the predominant system in the eastern United States, where
water is abundant.122 In the arid west, relatively few landowners live adjacent
to a body of water.123 Accordingly, prior appropriation allows those with water
rights to divert water and use it on land that is not adjacent to the water
source.124 Nevada, like most other western states, operates under a system of
prior appropriation.125
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. (quoting Hassell, 837 P.2d at 170–71).
117 Id. at 617.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 JOHN W. JOHNSON, UNITED STATES WATER LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 35 (2009).
121 Id. at 36.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 45.
124 Id.
125 PUBLICATIONS UNIT, RESEARCH DIVISION, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, WATER
RESOURCES: 2010–2011 POLICY AND PROGRAM REPORT 1 (2010), available at http://www.
leg.state.nv.us/Session/76th2011/Exhibits/Assembly/NRAM/ANRAM111H.pdf.
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Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, the first to acquire a water right
and put that water to beneficial use obtains a right to divert water from its
source, senior to all subsequent appropriators.126 In this context, “[b]eneficial
use means the water is actually put to use for such recognized beneficial uses
as: commercial, industrial, irrigation, mining, municipal, power generation, rec-
reation, wildlife, storage, or stockwatering.”127 Generally, the senior appropria-
tor maintains this right, until abandonment or commission of waste.128 Thus,
the senior appropriator receives a secure right in a “definite quantity of
divertible water.”129 The secure right of a specified amount of water, coupled
with the beneficial use requirement incentivizes senior appropriators to put the
water to good use.130 This system continues to facilitate development in
Nevada—an environment more suited to fostering cacti.
Unlike Nevada, California uses a “dual system” in which both the riparian
and appropriation doctrines apply to water rights.131 Early in the settlement of
California, homesteads were set up along rivers and the riparian system of
water law proved sufficient.132 However, as the gold rush permeated Califor-
nia, mining operations changed the nature of water distribution. Specifically,
miners had to divert water away from the source, for use at distant sites.133 In
recognition of this need, the system of prior appropriation also took hold in
California.134 The emergence of this dual system led to a conflicting scheme of
water administration.135 As is also true in Nevada, those with a right of prior
appropriation in California were required to put the water to beneficial use in
order to maintain their right.136 In contrast, holders of riparian rights were not
held to the same standard.137 To address these inconsistencies, California
amended its constitution to require all water users to put allocated water to
reasonable use.138 Thus, California adopted a “reasonable use” standard that
subjects all rights holders, whether riparian or appropriative, to the oversight of
the State Water Resources Control Board.139
126 JOHNSON, supra note 120, at 45.
127 PUBLICATIONS UNIT, RESEARCH DIVISION, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, supra note
125, at 1.
128 John P. Sande, IV, Note, A River Runs to It: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save Walker
Lake?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 831, 841–42 (2004).
129 Id. at 843.
130 Id.
131 CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS,
STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, A GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHT
APPROPRIATIONS 9 (2000) available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/publications_forms/publica-
tions/general/docs/l578.pdf.
132 Id.
133 STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, The Water Rights Process, http://www.
swrcb.ca.gov/waterrights/board_info/water_rights_process.shtml#public (last visited Nov.
11, 2012) (outlining the California Environmental Protection Agency’s water rights
processes and water issues).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
139 STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, supra note 133.
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VI. APPLYING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO NEVADA WATER LAW
Given the statutory and judicial foundation for the public trust doctrine, as
it relates to water law, it seems inevitable that the doctrine will apply to future
adjudications related to water rights. Specifically, NRS 533.025 provides that
all water within the boundaries of the state belongs to the public; the statute
classifies water as a public resource.140 Further, although Lawrence did not
explicitly extend the doctrine to include protection for water, the decision
opened the window for this extension. Thus, members of the public arguing for
protection of water resources will likely find the public trust doctrine useful.
Still, even with support in statutory provisions and public trust jurispru-
dence, application of the doctrine to water resources in Nevada remains uncer-
tain. Lawrence’s reliance on the gift clause makes it difficult to discern which
resources the public trust doctrine will encompass. As detailed by the Lawrence
court, the public trust doctrine, as an expression of the gift clause, requires the
state to act as “trustee for public resources.”141 However, which “resources” are
included? As Professor Sax noted, certain resources “have a peculiarly public
nature.”142 Water is an obvious example of just such a resource. Unlike owners
of other property rights, water appropriators own a right to the beneficial use of
the property, the water; they do not own the water itself.143 Further, the right to
use water is subject to the water rights of other appropriators.144 In Professor
Sax’s opinion, this peculiar nature makes it “incumbent upon the government to
regulate water uses for the general benefit of the community.”145 Several states,
each with considerably more water resources than Nevada, have adopted this
reasoning in applying the public trust doctrine to water use within their bounda-
ries.146 It seems logical for Nevada to follow suit, particularly since it is histori-
cally the driest state in the nation.147
However, even with constitutional, common law, and statutory support,
Nevada may choose to minimalize the impact of the public trust doctrine on
water law. Indeed, Nevada would not be alone in this minimalist approach.
Arizona, for instance, adopted the public trust doctrine in 1991 in a case similar
to Lawrence.148 Despite this adoption, the Arizona legislature refused to extend
140 NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (2011).
141 Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 612 (Nev. 2011).
142 Sax, supra note 8, at 485.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000) (declaring “the
public trust doctrine applies to all water resources without exception or distinction”); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1390(5) (West 2011) (extending the public trust to include protection of
groundwater resources); National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal.
1983) (applying the public trust doctrine to tributaries to navigable bodies of water).
147 Liz Osborn, Driest States in America, CURRENT RESULTS, http://www.currentresults.
com/Weather-Extremes/US/driest-states.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2012); see also United
States v. State Eng’r, 27 P.3d 51, 55 (Nev. 2001) (recognizing Nevada as the driest state in
the Nation and explaining the doctrines adopted to deal with the scarcity of water in
Nevada).
148 Arizona Ctr. for Law v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 168 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
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the doctrine to water rights.149 Ultimately, the Arizona Supreme Court declared
this refusal unconstitutional,150 but the court has yet to apply the doctrine to
water rights.151 This is particularly relevant to this discussion because Arizona,
like Nevada, based its public trust authority on the gift clause in the Arizona
Constitution152 and implicit statutory support.153 Further, considering their
proximity and similar climates, Nevada and Arizona face similar water admin-
istration problems.154 Thus, it is entirely plausible that Nevada will choose not
to apply the doctrine to water law.
If Nevada overcomes these hurdles and ultimately applies the doctrine to
water law, which bodies of water will it affect? In Lawrence, the court limited
the doctrine to waters that were navigable at the time of statehood. However,
considering the impact that diversion of non-navigable streams can have on
navigable bodies of water,155 extending the doctrine to include those non-navi-
gable tributaries, as California did in National Audubon, seems inevitable.
Water sources in arid western states like California and Nevada are often com-
posed of relatively small rivers feeding manufactured reservoirs designed to
foster population growth and economic development.156 Thus, limiting the doc-
trine to those rivers that were navigable at the time of statehood severely limits
149 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-263(B) (1995), invalidated by San Carlos Apache Tribe v.
Superior Ct., 972 P.2d 179, 201–02 (Ariz. 1999).
150 San Carlos Apache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 199.
151 Sharon Megdal, Joanna Nadeau & Tiffany Tom, The Forgotten Sector: Arizona Water
Law and the Environment, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 243, 264 (2011).
152 Hassell, 837 P.2d at 166.
153 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141 (1995) (declaring “[t]he waters of all sources,
flowing in streams, canyons, ravines or other natural channels, or in definite underground
channels, whether perennial or intermittent, flood, waste or surplus water, and of lakes,
ponds and springs on the surface, belong to the public and are subject to appropriation and
beneficial use as provided in this chapter”), invalidated in part by San Carlos Apache Tribe,
972 P.2d at 201.
154 Compare Sylvia Harrison, The Historical Development of Nevada Water Law, 5 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 148, 149 (2001) (describing the scarcity of water in Nevada as the
“defining circumstance of its water laws”), and Felicity Barringer, Las Vegas’s Worried
Water Czar, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (Sept. 28, 2010, 12:10 PM), http://green.blogs.
nytimes.com/2010/09/28/las-vegass-worried-water-czar/ (explaining the growth of Nevada
and the challenges that growth and current drought conditions present to the administration
of water in the state) with Aaron Citron, Working Rivers and Working Landscapes: Using
Short-Term Water Use Agreements to Conserve Arizona’s Riparian and Cultural Heritage, 1
ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 7, 12–14 (2010) (attributing the development of Arizona’s water
laws to the aridity of the environment), and KAREN L. SMITH, GRAND CANYON INSTITUTE,
ARIZONA AT THE CROSSROADS: WATER SCARCITY OR WATER SUSTAINABILITY? 1–4 (2011),
available at http://www.gwresources.com/Documents/publications/gci-arizona_at_the_
crossroads.pdf (detailing the increasing pressure on Arizona’s water resources caused by a
growing population and years of drought conditions).
155 National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 720–22 (Cal. 1983).
156 See, e.g., Nevada Division of Water Resources Department, The Role of Water in the
Early Development of Nevada, NEVADA WATER FACTS 1 (1992), http://www.pg-tim.com/
files/NV_Water_Facts.pdf (detailing the sources of water in Nevada); Kim Ross et al., Eco-
nomic Impacts of Climate Change on Nevada, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND CENTER FOR
INTEGRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 7 (2008), http://www.
cier.umd.edu/climateadaptation/Nevada%20Economic%20Impacts%20of%20Climate%20
Change.pdf (detailing Nevada’s reliance on Lake Mead and Lake Powell and the effect of a
water shortage on economic and population development).
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the scope of the doctrine in western states.157 Faced with this restraint, Califor-
nia determined that the purpose of the doctrine dictated expanding the doctrine
to protect non-navigable tributaries and the aesthetic and recreational values of
navigable bodies of water.158
Critics of expanding the doctrine to non-navigable waters argue that “the
application undervalues the right to private property; the doctrine gives a court
authority over complex administrative decisions where it lacks expertise;
and . . . the doctrine has an undemocratic nature.”159 The first of these objec-
tions warrants in-depth consideration. However, adherence to the principles
outlined in Professor Sax’s article alleviates the democratic concerns in the
second and third criticisms. Professor Sax saw judicial intervention in cases
involving the public trust doctrine as a safeguard against legislative overreach-
ing and one designed to ensure protection for a “diffuse majority.”160 Rather
than leaving complex water-allocation decisions to the judiciary, the doctrine
should arouse public interest in the water law debate and spark reconsideration
in a democratic body.161 Further, the doctrine gives a voice to private individu-
als impacted by water law administration. Thus, a private citizen, seeking
redress for perceived shortcomings in water law administration, can voice his
concern in the courts and force reconsideration in the legislature.
The debate over private property concerns is another matter entirely. If
Nevada follows the lead of National Audubon, as suggested by Justice Rose in
Mineral County, Nevada may import several critical considerations from the
pivotal California case. First, the government would have an “affirmative duty”
to protect the public interest.162 In Mineral County, Justice Rose suggested this
would be the responsibility of the state engineer as part of the engineer’s obli-
gations under Nevada water law.163 Second, allocations of previously adjudi-
cated stream systems that prove harmful to the public interest may be subject to
judicial review.164 Further, “any member of the general public has standing to
raise a claim of harm to the public trust.”165 Additionally, the considerations
crucial to the decision in National Audubon dealt exclusively with protecting
the aesthetic and recreational value of Mono Lake.166 Thus, if Nevada applies
the public trust doctrine to water law in a manner similar to California, any
member of the public can challenge existing or proposed diversions of water
that negatively affect the aesthetic value of a body of water. Accordingly, fol-
157 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 537.010–30 (LexisNexis 2012) (limiting navigability
to three bodies of water).
158 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 719, 721, 728–29.
159 Elise L. Larson, Note, In Deep Water: A Common Law Solution to the Bulk Water
Export Problem, 96 MINN. L. REV. 739, 759 (2011).
160 Sax, supra note 8, at 560. See also Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake
and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 708 (1995) (defining
the goal of the court in Mono Lake as an accommodation approach, designed to accommo-
date trust values and appropriation considerations when determining water rights).
161 Sax, supra note 8, at 560.
162 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 728.
163 Mineral Cnty. v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 808–09 (Nev. 2001) (en banc) (Rose, J.,
concurring).
164 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 729.
165 Id. at 716 n.11 (citations omitted).
166 Id. at 719.
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lowing National Audubon and adopting these public trust concepts introduces
uncertainty in an otherwise well-established water law system.
The system of prior appropriation used in Nevada fosters production by
affording water users certainty in water rights.167 Without this certainty, devel-
opers will likely hesitate to invest in projects that require constant water supply.
Furthermore, National Audubon advocated reevaluation of existing water
rights, introducing uncertainty in the administration of established rights.168
This upheaval may impair future and existing private property values, a major
criticism of expanding the doctrine.
The question then becomes whether to protect water resources in non-
navigable waters at the expense of private property owners’ certainty or limit
the doctrine to the protection of navigable waterways, leaving fewer distur-
bances in the current appropriation system. In his Mineral County concurrence,
Justice Rose endorsed an expansion of the doctrine in a manner similar to
National Audubon, anticipating a significant extension of the doctrine.169
According to Justice Rose:
[A]lthough the original scope of the public trust reached only navigable water, the
trust has evolved to encompass non-navigable tributaries that feed navigable bodies
of water. This extension of the doctrine is natural and necessary where . . . the navi-
gable water’s existence is wholly dependent on tributaries that appear to be over-
appropriated.170
Several factors weigh in favor of Justice Rose’s notion of expanding the
public trust. First, limiting the public trust doctrine to navigable waters in
Nevada significantly reduces the protection the doctrine offers vital bodies of
water in Nevada. Most of Nevada’s navigable bodies of water depend on non-
navigable tributaries.171 With Nevada’s water resources increasingly strained,
failure to protect the tributary means failure to protect the navigable body of
water. As the National Audubon court recognized, this limitation contravenes
the purpose of the public trust doctrine.172
Additionally, extending the doctrine to include non-navigable tributaries
does not automatically introduce uncertainty in all existing and future water
appropriations. Rather, it simply provides one more tool for those considering
the impacts of water administration. This is particularly important in protecting
environmental, aesthetic, and recreational values. Unlike water rights in com-
mercial and residential developments, the value of protecting environmental,
aesthetic, and recreational concerns is difficult to quantify. For instance, con-
sider the difficulty of proving the economic value of protecting the habitat of a
migratory bird compared with the relative ease of proving the value of a multi-
167 K. William Easter, Mark W. Rosengrant & Ariel Dinar, Formal and Informal Markets
for Water: Institutions, Performance, and Constraints, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 99,
100 (1999).
168 See Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 729–30.
169 Mineral Cnty. v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 807–08 (Nev. 2001) (en banc) (Rose, J.,
concurring).
170 Id. (citing Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 721).
171 See, e.g., Nevada Division of Water Resources Department, supra note 156, at 4; see
also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 537.010–30 (LexisNexis 2012) (limiting navigability to three
bodies of water).
172 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 720–21.
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million dollar commercial project. The developer of the commercial project
appears to have a distinct advantage. However, forcing administrators to con-
sider the public trust lends credence to the environmental concerns, leveling the
playing field somewhat. Further, Professor Sax’s notion of a judiciary safe-
guard ensures that water administrators fully consider these interests. Thus, the
public trust doctrine provides support for considerations otherwise incompati-
ble with economic valuation, while allowing water administrators to continue
considering the economic interests of other stakeholders.
As a check on water administration, rather than a tool to obliterate the
certainty of prior appropriation, the public trust doctrine allows private citizens
to speak out about the water administration process, through the courts, without
significantly affecting the existing system. In this fashion, the doctrine simply
adds another voice to the water allocation conversation. Given the scarcity of
water in Nevada and growing population demands, the need to consider and
protect all values associated with this precious resource must be of paramount
concern.
Although the impact on Nevada water law of adopting the public trust
doctrine remains unclear, it is certain that the adoption opens the door for pub-
lic trust challenges. At a minimum, the doctrine will apply to lands underneath
the navigable waters of the state. Ideally, however, Nevada courts will follow
California’s lead and make public trust considerations an integral part of every
water allocation decision, even if the water at issue is simply a non-navigable
tributary.
VII. CONFLICTS BETWEEN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA
Generally, two water allocation issues cause conflicts between neighbor-
ing states.173 First, states may disagree on the allocation of “interstate waters,”
meaning water that crosses state lines or forms the boundaries of states.174 Sec-
ond, when neighboring states export, by diversion, water that would otherwise
be exclusively subject to intrastate water laws, conflicts may arise.175 This Note
focuses primarily on conflicts regarding interstate waters. Typically, individual
citizens or the individual states initiate challenges to the inequitable distribution
of interstate water through either diversion or state specific allocation
decisions.176
Historically, the first method adopted to resolve interstate water disputes
was private suits between individual water users.177 The typical private suit
involved a downstream user in one state challenging the upstream user in
another.178 However, as water use increased, states began taking a more active
173 Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation, in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 43.01, at 43-3 (Amy L. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. LexisNexis/Mathew Bender 2011).
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.; Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 716 n.11 (citing Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal.
1971)).
177 Grant, supra note 173, § 44.01, at 44-1.
178 See, e.g., Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 218 U.S. 258, 259 (1910) (involv-
ing a challenge brought by a downstream user in Nevada against an upstream user in
California).
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role in defending the water rights of their citizens, particularly in the western
United States.179 To resolve these disputes, states began using two tools: equi-
table apportionment180 suits and water apportionment compacts181 between
states.182 Considering the nature of the public trust doctrine, this Note will
focus exclusively on private suits. However, it is important to note that appor-
tionment compacts and equitable apportionment each contributed to a decline
in the prevalence of private suits.183
The development of water law also led to a decline in private litigation.184
By the time states began taking an active role in water allocation disputes, the
law governing private suits was relatively settled.185 Accordingly, an upstream
state with the same water law as a downstream state could enforce the rights of
a downstream plaintiff as if both parties were from the same state.186 This
resulted in a significant reduction in the modern role of private suits.187 How-
ever, evolution in water law may result in a reemergence of the private suit.188
In particular, the public trust doctrine provides an impetus for this increase. For
example, a California citizen may challenge a Nevada citizen because water
used in Nevada is affecting the aesthetic value of a lake in California. Given
California’s expansive use of the doctrine and Nevada’s recent adoption, this
type of dispute is more likely to arise.
One of the most important considerations is which state’s governing law
should apply in private suit adjudications involving multiple states.189 When
state laws are the same, modern constitutional thought suggests that choosing
which state law to apply results in a false conflict.190 Essentially, “[t]here can
be no injury in applying [forum] law if it is not in conflict with that of any other
jurisdiction connected to th[e] suit.”191 Although this does not fully explain
how a law in one state can be enforced against a citizen of another, the “rule
against extraterritorial operation of state law stated in Pennoyer v. Neff has
become more flexible.”192 Thus, a state is less likely to restrict the application
179 Grant, supra note 173, § 44.01, at 44-1–44-2.
180 Equitable apportionment refers to the U.S. Supreme Court’s power to apportion water
among states with interstate water disputes “in such a way as will recognize the equal rights
of both and at the same time establish justice between them.” Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S.
46, 98 (1907).
181 Water apportionment contracts, or interstate compacts, refer to interstate agreements
regarding the allocation of water rights among states. See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River
& Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1938).
182 Grant, supra note 173, § 44.01, at 44-2.
183 Id.
184 Id. § 44.01, at 44-4.
185 Id.
186 Id.; see also Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 218 U.S. 258, 262 (1910)
(declaring that the laws of Californian and Nevada were similar enough that the first court to
obtain jurisdiction, in this case the Nevada federal court, should decide the matter without
interference from the foreign court).
187 Grant, supra note 173, § 44.01, at 44-4.
188 Id. § 44.01, at 44-5.
189 Id. § 44.02, at 44-5.
190 Id. § 44.05(a)(3), at 44-24.
191 Id. (alteration in original) (citing Phillips Petr. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816 (1985)).
192 Id.
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of another state’s water laws when the outcome of the adjudication would be
essentially the same if it applied its own law.193
Although California operates under a dual system of water law, the state’s
predominant water law scheme is the appropriative water rights system.194
Thus, a conflict between California and Nevada involving a body of water sub-
ject to prior appropriation laws may produce the “false conflict” issue discussed
above. However, the adoption of the public trust doctrine in both states, assum-
ing that Nevada expands the doctrine in a manner similar to California, may
upheave the settled law of both states and result in something akin to a true
conflict. True conflicts of law result when the outcome of a case differs
depending on the law applied.195 These conflicts may occur even when each
state applies the same water law doctrine to the disputed body of water because
the laws of the states “might differ in some particular important to the dis-
pute.”196 The variability of public trust considerations introduces such a
particular.
To illustrate, compare California’s expansion of the public trust doctrine
in National Audubon with Nevada’s adoption of the doctrine in Lawrence.
National Audubon expanded the doctrine to include the aesthetic value of
Mono Lake.197 Lawrence, on the other hand, limited application of the doctrine
to land beneath navigable waters.198 While Justice Rose advocated adopting the
doctrine in a manner similar to California in Mineral County,199 Nevada has
yet to take that step. Further, it appears that California’s expansion of the doc-
trine remains a minority position throughout the nation.200 Assuming Nevada
eventually applies the public trust doctrine to water law, but refuses to extend
the doctrine to aesthetic values, a true conflict will indeed exist, regardless of
the governing water law doctrine. One of the hallmarks of the National Audu-
bon decision is the ability of the individual citizen to sue water users whose
actions have a negative impact on the public trust.201 Thus, for instance, a Cali-
fornia citizen can initiate these true conflicts when a Nevada water user’s
actions affect a resource belonging to California’s public trust.
Which law should these neighboring states apply to resolve true public
trust conflicts in water law? In cases involving the same doctrine of water law,
one possible solution is the situs rule of property law.202 “Under th[is] rule[ ],
the existence of an appropriation, and the quantity of the right, would be gov-
193 Id. § 44.05(a)(3), at 44-25.
194 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
195 Grant, supra note 173, § 44.05(b), at 44-26.
196 Id.
197 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 728–29.
198 Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 617 (Nev. 2011).
199 Mineral Cnty. v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 808 (Nev. 2001) (en banc) (Rose. J., concurring).
200 Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doc-
trines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust,
37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 71 (2010) (discussing Hawaii and California’s unique extensions of
the doctrine to natural resources).
201 Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 730.
202 Grant, supra note 173, § 44.05(b)(1), at 44-27. For a specific definition of the situs rule,
see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 211 (1934) (declaring “[t]he original
creation of property in a tangible thing is governed by the law of the state where the thing is
at the time of the events which create the interests”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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erned by the law of the state in which the right is situated.”203 However, when
cases deal with interrelated property rights in two states and application of the
appropriate state law to each of the property rights would change the outcome
of the suit, the situs rule is indeterminate.204 Because of this indeterminacy,
some courts have abandoned the property law approach and instead applied tort
choice-of-law principles.205 Under traditional tort doctrine, the place where the
injury occurs governs the dispute.206 Thus, a downstream user in one state suf-
fering an injury at the hands of an upstream user in another state would subject
the upstream user to the laws of the downstream state. However, these choice-
of-law principles have been abandoned by many modern courts.207 Thus, even
in interstate water cases involving the same doctrine, the applicable law
remains uncertain.
Resolving choice-of-law questions in cases where different water law doc-
trines apply has proven more difficult.208 For instance, if a dispute involves an
interstate body of water governed by California’s riparian system and Nevada’s
prior appropriation system, whose law governs? Of the possible solutions pre-
viously discussed, the situs rule has “continuing wide appeal.”209 However,
“[a]s a corollary of this notion, the attributes of real property should not be
determined by the law of a foreign state.”210 This makes it less likely that a
court would choose to apply the law of one state and disregard the law of the
other.211 Another possible solution involves adopting a middle ground
approach, in which the court applies a special case-specific rule to resolve the
conflict.212
One possible example of this middle ground approach is Anderson v.
Bassman.213 Anderson involved a stream that flowed from California into
Nevada.214 The downstream plaintiffs had appropriations in Nevada and the
defendants had appropriations and riparian rights in California.215 During the
dry season, each party claimed the right to divert the entire flow of the stream
to the exclusion of the other.216 The court recognized that California law
applied to the defendants and Nevada law applied to the plaintiffs.217 However,
because each state allowed water diversion only for reasonable use, the court
determined that a “reasonable apportionment” of the water supply was the cor-
CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 9, topic 2, intro. note (1971) (declaring “questions involving interests
in immovables are governed by the law of the situs”).
203 Grant, supra note 173, § 44.05(b)(1), at 44-27.
204 Id.
205 Id. § 44.05(b)(1), at 44-28.
206 Id.; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377, 379 (1934).
207 Grant, supra note 173, § 44.05(b)(1), at 44-28, 44-29.
208 Id. § 44.05(b)(1), at 44-29.
209 Id. § 44.05(b)(2), at 44-29.
210 Id.
211 Id. § 44.05(b)(2), at 44-29, 44-30.
212 Id. § 44.05(b)(2), at 44-30.
213 Id.; Anderson v. Bassman, 140 F. 14 (N.D. Cal. 1905).
214 Anderson, 140 F. at 15.
215 Id. at 16–17.
216 Id. at 18.
217 Id. at 21–22.
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rect standard.218 Thus, the court found a broad rule of law followed by both
states and applied that rule to resolve a conflict involving opposing state laws.
Although Anderson appeared to involve a true conflict of laws, resolved
by a middle ground approach, the application of a standard followed by both
states arguably resembles a false conflict of laws.219 After all, the court did not
adopt a new equitable law to resolve a true conflict, but rather recognized a rule
of law common to both states. In the public trust context, it is unclear whether a
court will be able to find a mirror-image rule of law in the application of the
doctrine in California and Nevada. For instance, contrary to California’s exten-
sion of the doctrine in National Audubon, Nevada may refuse to extend the
doctrine to include water that is not navigable within the federal definition—a
plausible interpretation considering the importance the Lawrence court
extended to the navigability standard.220
Under these differing interpretations of the public trust doctrine, diver-
sions of an interstate stream that is not navigable may be subject to entirely
different regulations. For example, a California resident negatively impacted by
a diversion of water may argue that the diversion must be subject to public trust
considerations. Conversely, an opposing Nevada resident may argue that the
water is not navigable and therefore not subject to the trust. The result would be
a body of water governed by conflicting doctrines and a true conflict of laws,
even if, in the absence of the public trust doctrine, the same substantive water
law would apply. Thus, the Anderson approach is unlikely to resolve the con-
flict of laws presented by varying interpretations of the public trust doctrine
unless each state agrees on an equivalent adoption of the doctrine. Such uni-
formity is difficult to conceive, considering the variations in the expansions of
the doctrine throughout the country.221
If true conflicts in the application of the public trust doctrine are ines-
capable and no middle ground approach exists, one way to resolve these con-
flicts is adherence to a federal common law.222 On the day that the Supreme
Court decided Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, declaring that there is no “federal
general common law,”223 it stated in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co. that state law is not conclusive in apportioning interstate
streams.224 Rather, the Court declared that state courts should apply federal
common law in apportionment decisions between states.225 Although it never
expressly overruled Hinderlider, the Court has since advocated for deference to
218 Id. at 24, 29.
219 Grant, supra note 173, § 44.05(b)(2), at 44-30, 44-31.
220 Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 614 (Nev. 2011).
221 See, e.g., Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, Comment, The Evolution of the Public Trust Doc-
trine and the Degradation of Trust Resources: Courts, Trustees and Political Power in Wis-
consin, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 135, 137 (2000); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services
and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working Change From Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL.
L.J. 223, 228 (2006).
222 Grant, supra note 173, § 44.05(b)(2), at 44-32.
223 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
224 Grant, supra note 173, § 44.05(b)(2), at 44-33.
225 Id.; Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
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state laws in the adjudication of private water suits, leaving the governing
power of federal common law in question.226
One final possible resolution for true conflicts of law comes from the idea
that law can accommodate the competing interests involved. Courts routinely
hear disputes internal to their particular state and seek a resolution that accom-
modates the conflicting interests.227 Applying this concept to water law means
that courts can apply particular state laws to resolve the conflict, but instead of
considering only the interests of parties within the state, the court considers the
interests of parties from outside the state.228 The court seeks to accommodate
these interests “in a manner that best promotes net aggregate long-term com-
mon interests.”229 Thus, state-specific law may govern interstate water dis-
putes, but may differ from intrastate law due to the expanded consideration of
interests outside of the state.230 Although not without limitations, this accom-
modation approach seems the most plausible in public trust doctrine disputes
involving interstate waters.
Specifically, this final approach provides support for the fundamental con-
cept of the public trust: providing a voice to all interested parties. In an ideal
scenario, Nevada will follow California’s lead and expand the doctrine to
include protection for aesthetic and environmental concerns. However, regard-
less of the state law applied, the forum for adjudication, or the breadth of
Nevada’s public trust doctrine expansion, public trust principles would factor
into the final determination under this common interest approach. Suppose, for
instance, that a Nevada court hears a water appropriation case in which a Cali-
fornia plaintiff argues for protection of aesthetic values under the public trust
doctrine. Under the common interest approach, even if Nevada refuses to
extend the doctrine to protect these interests, a Nevada judge must consider
them because California affords them public trust consideration. Thus, the con-
cerns materialize in the judiciary regardless of whether Nevada expands the
doctrine. Consistent with Professor Sax’s argument, this ability to raise the con-
cern in the judiciary may ultimately prompt legislative action, leading to a dem-
ocratic determination regarding the water rights at issue. Of course, the
counter-argument is that the judge will choose which issues to consider, but the
ability to make the argument is a step in the right direction. This “step in the
right direction,” however, assumes that protection of Nevada’s water supply
and the associated aesthetic and recreational values is necessary.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Prior to Lawrence, private individuals in Nevada seeking protection for
public resources under the public trust doctrine, specifically in water law, had a
tenuous argument based on piecemeal statutory support and judicial approval.
Although the expansion of the doctrine remains uncertain, private individuals
226 California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978); Grant, supra note 173,
§ 44.05(b)(2), at 44-34.
227 Grant, supra note 173, § 44.05(b)(2), at 44-35.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
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can now make a compelling public trust argument. This argument, while not
without limitations, is a useful tool for protecting the aesthetic and recreational
value of Nevada’s water resources. However, regardless of one’s feelings
toward the public trust doctrine or the aesthetic and recreational value of water,
it seems that common ground exists in the notion of providing a voice for all
concerns. Living and adapting to Nevada’s dry climate requires careful consid-
eration of water administration and fully informed decisions make it more
likely that water will be allocated in the most efficient and productive manner
possible, both now and in the future. Thus, adopting the public trust doctrine
and applying it to Nevada water law is another useful tool for the state in its
continuing struggle to adapt to this arid environment.

